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The economics and public policy of student loans: Lessons for Colombia

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Student Loans: The world in summary

Let it be known that:

(i) Just about all countries want to have more finances for higher education;

- (ii) Just about all countries have student loan troubles;
- (iii) Just about all countries have problems with student loan defaults; and

(iv) Countries currently undergoing serious debates: Brazil, the UK, Malaysia, Japan, Chile and the US. Colombia is not alone!



- 1. Is there a case for university tuition charges?
- 2. Why are student loans necessary?

Outline

- 3. The major difference between TBRLs and ICLs
- 4. The critical role of administration for ICL5. Conclusion



International comparisons of tuition



"Free" HE:

 E.g. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Norway, Scotland, Sweden

About 1/3 of OECD

- Tuition Charges:
- E.g. Australia, Brazil,
 Canada, China, Colombia,
 England, France, Hungary,
 Italy, Japan, New Zealand,
 Portugal, Spain, the US

About 2/3 of OECD



Is there a case for charging university tuition?





- i. What does "free" higher education actually mean?
- ii. Private rates of return to higher education are high: see ageearnings profiles
 - iii. Not charging tuition fee is regressive and inequitable (see Karl Marx)
 - iv. Additional money can be used to grow the system (e.g. Australia and the UK)



Age-Earnings Profiles: Vietnam











Age-Earnings Profiles: South Korea











Age-Earnings Profiles: England




HE Graduate




High School Graduate




Age-Earnings Profiles: Brazil





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
Age-Earning Profiles Colombia



Non-graduate

HE graduate





"If ... higher education institutions are also "free", that only means in fact defraying the cost of education of the bourgeoisie from the general tax receipts."

Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, 1875





Additional money can be used to grow the system (e.g. Australia and the UK)

(i) With tuition each additional university place costs the government less; thus

(ii) Tuition makes it easier for the government to have a larger HE system;

(iii) Australian and UK places increased: 280 and 200%





Why are Student Loans Necessary?

i. Risky investments: non-graduation, poor jobs

ii. Poor education/employment outcomes for students/graduates can lead to default

iii. With no saleable collateral, banks/governments are unprotected





Two types of loans:

Time-based Repayment Loans (TBRL):

US, Canada, Colombia, China, Japan, Brazil, Chile

Income-contingent Loans (ICL):

Australia, New Zealand, England, Hungary, South Korea





Understanding TBRLs





The Effects of TBRLs

- Because capacity to pay is ignored, TBRLs can mean:
 - Repayment hardship and anxiety
 - Borrowing from loan sharks, or friends and family
 - Defaults: loss of credit reputation (Canada poster)
 - Low government revenue from deferment or default
 - High collection inefficiencies and costs from chasing loans
 - Family formation distortions



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REMBOURSEZ VOTRE PRÊT D'ÉTUDES DU CANADA

POUR ÉVITER D'ÊTRE EN DÉFAUT DE PAIEMENT, COMMUNIQUEZ AVEC VOTRE <u>BANQUE</u> :

- · au début de chaque année scolaire:
- . A faithride vos études:
- · si vous deménagez:
- · si yous abandonnez you Hudes,
- . si vous devenez etxilant à temps partiel.

SINON VOICI LES CONSÉQUENCES :

- · votre reputation de solvato libé sera ternie;
- · vous maurez plus droit à des prêts d'études,
- · yous terez l'obset de mesures de recouvrement,
- · vos remboursements d'impôt seront reterus

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REPAY YOUR CANADA STUDENT LOAN

TO AVOID DEFAULTING, KEEP IN TOUCH WITH YOUR BANK!

- · when you begin a new school year,
- · at the end of your studies
- if you move.
- · if you drop out.
- · if you become a part-time shadent.

CONSEQUENCES IF YOU DON'T:

- · poor credit rating.
- no further Canada Student Loans.
- ◆ collection action.
- · withholding of income tax refunds.

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The Critical Role of Repayment Burdens in TBRLs


$$Repayment\ burden_t = \frac{Loan\ repayment\ _t}{Income\ _t}$$

- High RBs lead to anxiety, consumption hardship, borrowing from loan sharks and defaults
- How high can RBs be?



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International comparison of RBs with TBRLs (bottom 20% of graduate earners)



■ Males

■ Females





International experience of defaults with TBRL (per cent)

Brazil: >30

Canada: 15

Colombia: 30-35

Malaysia: 40-60

Thailand: 45-65

Philippines: 90

Thailand: 45-70

US: 20-25

Default risks for borrowers is a major concern





TBRLs and ICLs: Family formation and job choice

- Major parts of TBRLs are being paid by family members so this must influence marriage and fertility decisions
- ii. TBRL and occupational choice: the case of US lawyers
- iii. Thus TBRLs are inefficient and distortionary from the perspective of economic choice





Understanding ICLs





Understanding ICLs





The Effects of ICLs

ICLs have no repayments when incomes are low, so:

- No repayment when unemployed, automatic
- No repayment when in low paying jobs, automatic
- No repayment if not in the labour force eg rearing a child, automatic

Therefore:

- No repayment hardships
- No struggle or anxiety
- No default and credit reputation loss
- No loss of future government revenue from default

Also:

- Highly efficient if collected by employers;
- No job choice of family formation distortions





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- ii. No payment at enrolment, debts recorded with the ATO (IRS), employer with-holding (admin costs trivial: < 1% of annual revenue)
- iii. No payment until earn \$A47,000 pa, 1-810% (therefore, no payment when in low paid job, child-rearing, unemployed)
- iv. Debt continues until repaid, or death
- v. Indexed to CPI
- vi. Enrolments increased by 280% by 2020
- vii. No access issues, enrolments from the poor increased by 300%
- viii. Adopted by 6 other countries, 3 others close







International comparison of RBs with ICLs (max % of annual income)

Australia: 10

• NZ: 10

England: 9

Hungary: 6

Thus, RB risks for borrowers are a zero concern for ICLs!





International ICL Experience of Defaults (%)

Australia: 0

England: 0

New Zealand: 0

Hungary: 0





Student Loans in the Time of COVID

- (i) Major macroeconomic disruptions illustrate the problems of TBRL: repayment hardships and defaults;
- (ii) Remember: Defaults can ruin borrowers' (graduates') lives;
- (iii) Remember: Defaults can ruin governments' budgets;
- (iv) Recently is the worst time in history for TBRL borrowers; the best time in history for ICL borrowers.
- (v) ICL avoid recession problems for borrowers and governments






Images of TBRLs and ICLs





TBRLS







TBRLS











The critical role of ICL administration

- For the government:
 - i. All countries are different; but
 - ii. Employer with-holding is critical and very efficient
 - iii. Close to no transactions costs
- For the student/graduate:
 - i. Automaticity is very valuable
 - ii. No actions need to be taken (no need for applications or documentation
 - iii. Close to no transaction costs






Conclusion

- i. There is a strong case for tuition
- ii. Student loans are necessary
- iii. The two loan options differ radically: collection is everything
- iv. TBRLs incur difficult RBs, default and credit reputation losses, administratively expensive
- v. ICLs provide insurance against repayment difficulties and default
- vi. For governments ICLs are likely to maximise revenue
- vii. Transactions costs for ICL are close to zero





Muchas gracias!



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